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BANE OF AMERICAN FORFEITURE LAW-
BANISHED AT LAST?
Forfeiture statutes impose upon law-abiding citizens a degree
of vicarious liability otherwise unknown in American law. Under
the conventional view, forfeiture is a civil sanction imposed in an in
rem proceeding against "guilty" property rather than against the
owner. Theoretically, the owner is not punished because the forfei-
ture is directed against the property. The rationale is that the
property has "offended" and can be condemned regardless of the
owner's actions;' no suit need ever be brought against the owner,
who may, in fact, be innocent of any wrongdoing.
2
Courts have repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of forfei-
ture statutes.3 In United States v. United States Coin & Currency,4 the
Supreme Court justified the broad sweep of vicarious liability
under these statutes:
[C]enturies of history support the Government's claim that for-
feiture statutes similar to this one.have an extraordinarily broad
scope .... Simply put, the theory has been that if the object is
"guilty," it should be held forfeit. In the words of a medieval
English writer, "Where a man killeth another with the sword of
John at Stile, the sword shall be forfeit as deodand, and yet no
default is in the owner." 5
In 1970 Congress took a new approach to forfeiture by enact-
ing two criminal control statutes6 that sanction the imposition of
forfeiture in criminal prosecutions, rather than in traditional in
rem suits. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were sub-
sequently amended in 1972 to make possible such "criminal
' In this Note, the concept of "offending" property is referred to as the "personifica-
tion fiction."
2 Thus, one mother lost her car under a narcotics forfeiture statute when her son un-
wittingly transported a passenger who was carrying one-thirtieth of an ounce of con-
traband marijuana. United States v. One 1957 Oldsmobile Auto., 256 F.2d 931 (5th Cir.
1958).
3 See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) (noted in
60 CORNELL L. REv. 467 (1975)).
4 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
5 Id. at 719-20 (footnote omitted).
6 Organized Crime Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1970); Comprehensive Drug Pre-
vention and Control Act, 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2) (1970). The two statutes mandate forfeiture
of certain illegal interests held by organized crime in commercial enterprises.
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forfeitures. '7 Prior to that time, the Rules had excluded all for-
feitures from their scope in accord with the conventional view that
forfeiture was necessarily civil and in rem.
8
The effect of the Federal Rules amendments on pre-1970 for-
feiture statutes is, as yet, unresolved. But in United States v. Hall,9
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the amendments
applied to a pre-1970 forfeiture statute and dismissed an indict-
ment on the ground that the failure to provide mandatory
notice' deprived the defendant of the opportunity to defend
against the forfeiture." The United States Department of Justice
contends that Hall was wrongly decided. 12 It argues that the new
amendments do not affect preamendment forfeiture statutes,
which the Department characterizes as "civil."' 3 A possible revolu-
tion in the law of forfeiture and the applicability of constitutional
guarantees to forfeiture proceedings turns upon the outcome of
this conflict.
This Note analyzes the history of forfeiture, both in England
and in the United States, and attempts to reconcile the divergent
views on the effect of the 1972 Federal Rules amendments. A
framework for future resolution of the conflict is suggested.' 4
I FED. R. GRIM. P. 7(c)(2), 31(e), 32(b)(2), 54(b)(5).
8 See notes 148, 160-64 and accompanying text infra.
9 521 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1975). The facts in Hall are set forth in notes 149-54 and ac-
companying text infra.
IFED. lt. CRMd. P. 7(c)(2).
11521 F.2d at 408. See notes 155-59 and accompanying text infra. Cf. Neal v. Morse,
134 Mich. 186, 96 N.W. 14 (1903) (notice to defendant required when question of forfei-
ture to be tried in suit for violation of fish and game statute).
12 Department of Justice Memo No. 828 to all United States Attorneys in the Ninth
Circuit (Mar. 23, 1976) (on file at the Cornell Law Review), citing S. REP. No. 617, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969).
1d.
4See text accompanying notes 160-67 infra.
Before starting analysis, it is necessary to explain the terminology to be used through-
out this Note. The terms in personam and in rem are used in their usual sense. In per-
sonam refers to an action directed against a person that may result in personal liability,
either civil or criminal. In rem refers to an action directed solely against property, in which
the rights of all the world to that property are determined. However, the terms civil, crim-
inal, penal, and remedial will be used in a specialized sense. Anglo-American law is tradi-
tionally divided into criminal and civil categories, but this division has never been perfect.
Civil suits often impose punishment, such as civil penalties and punitive damages in tort
suits. In this Note, the terms criminal and civil identify solely the mode of process. The
terms penal, remedial, punitive, and regulatory are used to describe the character of the
sanction imposed. Traditionally, remedial sanctions corresponded to compensation. Any
legal (i.e., non-equitable) sanction that was not compensatory was therefore penal. Al-
though penal still denotes punishment, remedial no longer refers solely to compensation.
When the government is the p!aintiff, a sanction may be considered remedial if it protects
or promotes a governmental function, even though the government has suffered no actual




FORFEITURE IN ENGLAND AND THE AMERICAN
COLONIES BEFORE 1776
Forfeiture of property is one of the oldest sanctions of
Anglo-American law, originating with the beginnings of public
wrongs during the Anglo-Saxon period. 15 Early English law distin-
guished between three types of forfeiture-forfeiture consequent
to attainder, 6 statutory forfeiture, 17 and deodand.' 8 The oldest
and best known was forfeiture consequent to attainder, which in-
flicted on felons and traitors the complete forfeiture of all real and
personal property. The forfeiture was not part of the sentence, but
followed as a consequence of conviction for felony or treason and
judgment of legal death.' 9 Statutes also imposed lesser forfeitures
for lesser violations, ranging from forfeiture of a specific piece of
property, to forfeiture of all personal property.2" The exact prop-
erty forfeit was specified in the sentence of judgment. Finally, the
common law imposed forfeiture of the instrument of a man's
death, known as deodand. 2' Today deodands are spoken of as the
spiritual predecessors of forfeiture statutes, 22 but evidence suggests
In this Note, penal refers to punishment, whether imposed in a dvil or criminal ac-
tion. Remedial, on the other hand, is used in the modern sense discussed above, except
where the context indicates otherwise. Punitive refers to a primarily penal suit that requires
a showing of criminal or moral guilt. Regulatory, on the other hand, refers to a primarily
remedial suit. See generally Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for
Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REv. 379 (1976).
'5 E.g., Laws of Ine, c. 6 (circa 688-695), collected in 1 F. LIEBERMANN, DIE GESETZE DER
ANGELSACHSEN 91 (1903). See generally T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON
LAW 442-62 (5th ed. 1956); 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
462-511 (2d ed. 1911).
16 See text accompanying notes 32-38 infra.
7 See text accompanying notes 40-44 infra.
"See text accompanying notes 24-31 infra.
19 See Commonwealth v. Pennock, 3 Serg. & Rawl. 199 (Pa. 1817); 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *386. See generally id. at *380-89; 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF
THE CROWN 239-57, 341-70 (1st Am. ed. Philadelphia 1847) (lst ed. London 1736); 2 W.
HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 637-49 (8th ed. London 1824) (1st ed.
London 1716-21). Forfeiture of personalty followed conviction, while realty was forfeited
only after attainder, that is, judgment. In this Note, the several forms are treated together
as forfeiture consequent to attainder.
2" See notes 40-44 and accompanying text infra.
21 See notes 24-31 and accompanying text infra.
22 See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-83 (1974).
Holmes once tried to show that the maritime lien originated in the principle of deodand.
0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 23-34 (1881). His reconstruction has been correctly termed
"flims[y]," resting upon scholarship that is "ingenuous rather than solid." G. GILMORE & C.
BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 484 (1957). Gilmore and Black suggest that Holmes did
not adhere to the personification fiction while on the Supreme Court. Id. at 503-04.
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that when actually imposed they were considered atypical.23
A. Deodand
In the early middle ages deodands may have served as an
alternative to the blood feud of early justice-the instrument of
death replacing the slayer's kin as the object of vengeance.
24
Throughout the later middle ages, deodands were one of many
prerogatives of the English kings, providing a small but steady
source of income. The principle underlying deodand was sui
generis and did not extend to other areas of forfeiture law. English
forfeiture statutes did not rest upon analogy to deodand;25 indeed,
attempts to raise the analogy were specifically rejected. In 1766, in
a case before the Court of the Exchequer, the Crown argued that
deodand represented a general principle of forfeiture law.26 Chief
Baron Parker rejected the argument, citing Chief Justice Vaughn
for the proposition that "goods as goods, cannot offend, forfeit,
unlade, pay duties, or the like, but [only] men whose goods they
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has cited Holmes for the contention that deodands are
the forerunners of modem forfeiture statutes. United States v. United States Coin & Cur-
rency, 401 U.S. 715, 720 (1971).
23 See text accompanying notes 25-31 infra.
24 The deodand was referred to as the dead man's malefactor or bane. 2 H. BRACTON,
ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND, 328, 350 (Thorne trans. 1968). Maitland ob-
served that the concept of deodand is not much different from the instinct to curse the
chair over which one stumbles. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 15, at 474. Cf
United States v. One 6.5mm. Mannlicher-Carcano Military Rifle, 250 F. Supp. 410 (N.D.
Tex.), rev'd sub nom. King v. United States, 364 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1966) (forfeiture sought
of rifle used to kill President Kennedy). See generally Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Histor-
ical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty,
46 T mp. L.Q. 169 (1973); Law of Deodands, 34 LAw MAGAZINE 188 (1845).
25 Two Anglo-Saxon laws provided that if a lord compelled his slave to work on a
festival day, the lord should be fined and the slave (the "guilty property") should be set
free. Laws of Canute, c. 45 (circa 1016-1035), and Laws of Ine, c.3 (circa 688-695), collected
in I F. LIEBERMANN, supra note 15, at 342-45, 90-9 1. A fourteenth century law of the town of
Cork explicitly provided that the penalty should be imposed "in such a way that the
[violator] shall suffer the forfeiture." 2 Borough Customs 174 (Selden Soc'y Vol. 21, 1906).
See also 14 Hen. 6, c. 5 (1435).
The American fiction of "guilty property" originates not by analogy to deodand, but in
decisions of the early nineteenth century. See notes 81-91 and accompanying text infra.
The earliest American forfeiture cases do not show reliance on the fiction of guilty prop-
erty. The cases are digested in L. DAY, THE CONSTITUTIONALITY AND LEGALITY OF CON-
FISCATIONS IN FEE, UNDER ACT OF JULY 17, 1862, at 60-68 (New Orleans 1870). The first
case to introduce the fiction was a circuit decision by Justice Marshall, involving the admis-
sibility of a master's statement in a forfeiture proceeding. United States v. The Little
Charles, 26 F. Cas. 979, 982 (C.C.D. Va. 1818) (No. 15,612). See also G. GILMORE & C.
BLACK, supra note 22, at 485, 503-04. The fiction has fallen into disrepute in admiralty. Id.
at 510; see note 85 and accompanying text infra. See also Continental Grain Co. v. Barge
FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19 (1960).
26 Mitchell qui tam v. Torup, Parker 227, 145 Eng. Rep. 764 (Ex. 1766).
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are."27 Thus, reliance upon deodand as a general forfeiture prin-
ciple of early English law is probably misplaced. The only English
authority cited as proof that deodand represents a general forfei-
ture principle is one sentence from St. German's Doctor & Student
28
dialogues, published in 1530-the very John at Stile remark quoted
by the Supreme Court.29 But a careful reading of the sentence in
context does not support that conclusion. The Student's reference
to deodand was not to illustrate a general principle of law that
"guilty" property may be held forfeit.3 " Rather, the Student of-
fered deodand as but one example of property being taken by law
from an owner who was without fault. In any case, the Doctor,
representing the viewpoint of the chancellor in equity, rejected the
Student's suggestion and insisted upon a better reason for taking
property from its owner.3' The Student did not press the argu-
ment and quickly offered an alternate explanation.
B. Vicarious Liability for Forfeiture Consequent to
Attainder and Statutory Forfeiture
Insofar as they imposed broad vicarious liability, deodands
were out of character in the later middle ages. Anglo-American law
has not lightly held one man responsible for the acts of another.
32
27 Id. at 236, 145 Eng. Rep. at 767, citing Sheppard v. Gosnold, Vaughn 159, 172, 124
Eng. Rep. 1018, 1024 (C.P. 1673). Vaughn's comment is quoted with approval in Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 637 (1886).
21 ST. GERMAN, DOCTOR & STUDENT 291 (Selden Soc'y Vol. 91, 1974).2 See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
3' ST. GERMAN, supra note 28, at 291-92.
31 See text accompanying note 198 infra for an excerpt from the Doctor's answer.
In the dialogues the Doctor generally represents the position of the canon law and the
chancellor in equity, while the Student generally takes the position of the common law. W.
HOLDSWORTH, SOME MAKERS OF ENGLISH LAW 95-97 (1938). See also Barton, Introduction to
ST. GERMAN, supra note 28, at xlix. In this particular dialogue the Doctor sought to have
the Student rationalize the medieval law of wreck and explain why the chancellor should
not continue to interfere with the common law in order to protect blameless owners whose
goods were seized.
32 As late as the seventeenth century, a master was civilly liable only for acts of his
servant that were at his direct command or were afterwards ratified by him. T. PLUCKNETT,
supra note 15, at 472-75. See also 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 371-88
(5th ed. 1942); 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra, at 472-82 (2d ed. 1937); 1 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *429-32. Vicarious criminal liability did not accompany the development of
vicarious civil liability: "It is a point not to be disputed, but that in criminal cases the
principal is not answerable for the act of the deputy, as he is in civil cases .... " Rex v.
Huggins, 2 Strange 882, 885, 93 Eng. Rep. 915, 917 (C.P. 1730). See Sayre, Criminal Re-
sponsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 HARV. L. REV. 689, 700-01 (1930).
To this day, the master's liability has almost always been limited to repairing the injury
done by the servant; only rarely has the master been held criminally liable for his servant's
deeds without his own complicity or failure in a public duty. See id. at 723. The distinction
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Forfeiture law, on the other hand, has often been the focus of
attempts to expand vicarious liability. Forfeiture appealed to the
English Crown both because forfeited estates of attainted traitors
and felons added substantially to the Crown domain 33 and because
statutory forfeitures were the principal means of tax enforce-
ment.34 As early as the fourteenth century, the Crown was able
to expand the definition of an attainted's property to include
goods held as bailee.35 This early imposition of vicarious liability
was halted by a provision in the Statute of Staples of 1353.36
Thereafter, common-law forfeiture normally took only the interest
the attainted traitor or felon had in the property.3 7 But the vicari-
ous aspect of attainder was not the harshest consequence to befall
innocent third parties. Attainder of felony meant that children
could not inherit the forfeited property of their attainted parents,
but it also brought about corruption of the blood-i.e., no descen-
dant could ever trace a line of inheritance through the attainted
between compensation and punishment is an old one. Compare Leges Henrici Primi, c. 5,
§ 28b (circa 1100) (Downer trans. 1972), with id., c. 88, § 6a.
In the past half century, however, American courts have allowed a degree of vicarious
criminal liability largely in the area of food and drug regulation, by imposing on entirely
innocent corporate officials "a duty to implement measures that will insure that violations
will not occur." United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672 (1975). Awareness of wrongdoing
is not necessary for conviction. Id. at 672-73. See also United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S.
277 (1942).
33See 1 T. MADOX, THE HISTORY AND ANTIQUITIES OF THE EXCHEQUER OF THE KINGS
OF ENGLAND 295-302, 343-48 (2d ed. London 1769) (Ist ed. London 1711); A. STEEL, THE
RECEIT OF THE EXCHEQUER 1377-1485, passim (1954).
34 See Hale, Concerning the Custom of Goods Imported and Exported, in HARGRAVE'S LAW
TRACTS 226-28 (Dublin 1787).
35 T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 15, at 474.
36 "No merchant or other person . . . shall lose or forfeit his goods or merchandise
for any trespass or forfeiture incurred by his servant, unless his act is by the command and
consent of his master . 27 Edw. 3, C. 19 (1353) (translation in T. PLUCKNETT, supra
note 15, at 474).
37 Property held by an attainted as trustee, executor, administrator, or corporate of-
ficer was not forfeit. See, e.g., Hix v. Harrison, 3 Bulstrode 210, 81 Eng. Rep. 177 (K.B.
1616) (opinion of Coke, C.J.). Generally the dower rights of an attainted's widow were lost.
But her jointure-that is, property jointly enfeoffed to her and the attainted-was usually
saved. I M. HALE, supra note 19, at 247-53.
Nevertheless, vicarious liability was still possible through the doctrine of relation back;
forfeiture of real estate, but not chattels, related back to reach all property held by the
attainted at the date of the offense, overcoming subsequent transfers to even bona fide
purchasers. Blackstone explained that forfeiture of goods did not relate back because
"chattels are of so vague and fluctuating a nature, that to affect them by any relation back
would be attended with more inconvenience than in the case of landed estates .... " 2 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *421. Justice Story thought that the relation back of real es-
tate could only be explained by the "barbaric character" of an earlier time. United States v.
1960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 188, 198 (1814) (dissenting opinion). See also
Attorney General v. Weeks, Bunbury 223, 145 Eng. Rep. 654 (Ex. 1726); note 74 infra.
.1977]
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ancestor. Largely because of attainder's harsh consequences for
innocent descendants, common-law forfeiture quickly fell into dis-
repute in America.
3 8
Despite its failure to extend liability consequent to common-
law attainder, the Crown was able to impose broader vicarious
liability under certain forfeiture statutes relating to customs and
shipping.39 Under these acts, the misdeeds of the ship's master
could subject the shipowner to forfeiture of his cargo and some-
times his ship. Although this liability was imposed by common-law
courts, it was in keeping with contemporary trends in courts of
maritime and merchant law. In most cases before the seventeenth
century, only the goods on which duty had not been paid were
forfeited.4
In the mid-seventeenth century, Parliament enacted the
Navigation Acts, the broadest of English forfeiture statutes. 4' The
Navigation Acts were the major component of English policy to
promote national seapower. They required the shipping of most
commodities in English built, owned, and manned vessels. Viola-
tion of the Acts resulted in forfeiture of both the illegally carried
goods and the ship that transported them.42 The English courts
construed these statutes so that the act of an individual seaman, un-
dertaken without the knowledge of master or owner, could cause a
forfeiture of the entire ship. Chief Baron Parker, speaking for the
Court of Exchequer, explained:
These words [of the statute] are ... negative, absolute, and
prohibitory; . . . there is not a syllable that hints at the privity or
consent of the master, mate or owners.
The reason of penning this clause in these strong terms is to
prevent as much as possible its being evaded, for if the privity or
consent of the master, mate or owners, had been made necessary
to the forfeiture, it would have opened a door for perpetual
evasion, and the provisions of this excellent act for the increase
of the navigation would have been defeated.
43
18 2 J. KENT,. COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 317 (New York 1827). See notes 67-68
and accompanying text infra.
3' See Hale, supra note 34, at 149-50.
4, Id. at 150.
4 1
See L. HARPER, THE ENGLISH NAVIGATION LAWS: A SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY Ex-
PERIMENT IN SOCIAL ENGINEERING 387-414 (1964) (digest of Acts).
42 
Id. at 109.
43 Mitchell qui tam v. Torup, Parker 227, 232-33, 145 Eng. Rep. 764, 766 (Ex. 1766).
Accord, Idle qui tam v. Vanheck, Bunbury 230, 145 Eng. Rep. 657 (Ex. 1727). The customs
statutes, on the other hand, were read restrictively to avoid imposing forfeitures in the
absence of culpability. E.g., Attorney General v. Flower, Bunbury 227, 145 Eng. Rep. 656
[Vol. 62:768
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The court narrowed the effect of its holding by stating that a jury
would be justified in finding no forfeiture, if the quantity of con-
traband was so small that the master could not have discovered it
after a reasonable search. 44 Thus, under the Navigation Acts, for-
feiture of a ship carrying contraband was required only if the
owner or his carefully chosen master was implicated or negligent.
C. Exchequer Forfeiture Procedure
Forfeitures under the customs and navigation statutes were
usually imposed in proceedings in the Exchequer, the court of the
King's revenue. Suits in the Exchequer for forfeitures were com-
menced by civil information, either by a Crown attorney or by an
individual suing qui tam;45 they were either in personam or in rem
depending upon the statute or seizure involved. 46 As the forfeiture
was often the lesser punishment, it was common for the owner not
to contest it for fear of further proceedings in personam. If the
owner was available, the forfeiture evidently was imposed only
upon confession or adjudication of his guilt, at least until the time
of the Navigation Acts.
47
(Ex. 1726); Sheppard v. Gosnold, Vaughn 159, 124 Eng. Rep. 1018 (C.P. 1683); Reniger v.
Fogassa, Plowden 1, 75 Eng. Rep. 1 (Exch. Ch. 1551).
44 Mitchell qui tam v. Torup, Parker 227, 237-38, 145 Eng. Rep. 764, 767 (Ex. 1766).
In so ruling, the court held that an old English principle, that an owner should not lose his
ship for the carriage of a small amount of contraband without his knowledge, was applica-
ble to the Navigation Acts. The doctrine dates at least from the statute, 38 Edw. 3, c. 8
(1363). The court modified the principle by holding that the privity of the master would
suffice. See also Idle qui tam v. Vanheck, Bunbury 230, 145 Eng. Rep. 657 (Ex. 1727). See
generally Hale, supra note 34, at 149-50. At one time the doctrine was approved in the
United States. See Phile qui tam v. The Anna, 1 Dall. (1 U.S.) 187, 206 (C.P. Phila. County
1787). But today, "the smallness of the quantity of marihuana transported or concealed is
not a basis for granting remission." United States v. One 1957 Oldsmobile Auto., 256 F.2d
931, 933 (5th Cir. 1958). See also United States v. One 1973 Dodge Van, 416 F. Supp. 43,
46 (E.D. Mich. 1976),
45 An action qui tam is brought by an individual suing for himself and the state; it is
also known as an informer's suit. 1 M. BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW, Actions
Qui Tam 61 (6th ed. London 1807) (Ist ed. London 1736).
4' For the practice of the Court of Exchequer in forfeiture cases, see L. HARPER, supra
note 42, at 111-12; E. HooN, THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ENGLISH CUSTOMS SYSTEM
1696-1786, at 277-80 (1968). For contemporary treatments, see "B.Y.," THE MODERN PRAC-
TICE OF THE COURT OF EXCHEQUER (London 1731); G. GILBERT, A TREATISE ON THE COURT
OF EXCHEQUER (London 1758); J. MANNING, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF EXCHEQUER
(London 1827). The Exchequer was one of the three common-law courts at Westminster.
The origin of the Exchequer's unusual in rem jurisdiction was probably in its exercise
of the Crown's ancient prerogative over derelict property, wreck of the sea, waifs, and
strays. It is not clear exactly when the Exchequer began to assert in rem jurisdiction over
forfeitures. However, it must have been natural to extend jurisdiction to goods seized
when the owner was unknown or had run off, since such goods could be considered dere-
lict. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *262; G. GILBERT, supra, at 180-82.
47 See, e.g., the Case of Shipping Wools to Calais (1458), SELECT CASES IN THE
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Circumstances of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries fa-
vored greater use of the in rem action in the Exchequer at the
expense of in personam proceedings. When suing in rem, an
"informer" 48 could proceed alone without Crown interference. If
no liability beyond the forfeiture was involved, the informer could
negotiate a money settlement with the claimant-owner to avoid the
expense of trial. The in rem action had the further advantage of
placing the burden of proof on the claimant-owner to refute the
forfeiture.4 9 In contrast, when proceeding in personam, the in-
former had to prove the forfeiture by establishing that the carrying
ship or its crew was not British. Shifting the burden of proof onto
the claimant was particularly helpful as commerce grew more
complicated and it became increasingly difficult to identify the
owners and obtain jurisdiction over them.511 Since the sanction for
violation of the Navigation Acts was usually limited to forfeiture,
the Acts further encouraged the trend toward the in rem action.5 1
D. Adoption of Forfeiture in the American Colonies
In the American colonies the criminal law did not automatical-
ly follow that of England; it depended on local adoption, except as
Parliament specifically directed.5 2 As a result, the law of forfeiture
varied substantially from colony to colony. For example, forfeiture
consequent to attainder was largely abolished in Massachusetts,
53
in disuse in New York,5 4 but fairly widely used in Pennsylvania 55
EXCHEQUER CHAMBER BEFORE ALL THE JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 144 (Selden Soc'y Vol. 51,
1933). There the court stated that, under the customs statute involved, the party suing qui
tam "shall have a third [of the forfeiture], after [the offender] is duly attainted or confesses
this in a court of record etc." Id.
48 See note 45 supra.
19 12 Geo. 1, c. 28, § 8 (1725).
50 See note 46 supra.
", See Mitchell qui tam v. Torup, Parker 227, 236, 145 Eng. Rep. 764, 767 (Ex. 1766).
In the colonies, forfeiture was usually the only penalty. REPORTS OF CASES IN THE VICE
ADMIRALTY OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW YORK (1715-1788) 270 (Hough ed. 1925) [hereinafter
cited as N.Y. V. Adm. Rep.].
52 Smith, The English Criminal Law in Early America, in J. SMITH & T. BARNES, THE
ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM: CARRYOVER TO THE COLONIES 16-21, 41 (1975).
13 In 1641 Massachsetts abolished all forfeitures, save those specifically imposed by
statute. THE COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS WITH SUPPLEMENTS 1660-72, at 35 (Whit-
more ed. 1889); 5 N. DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGEMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW 4
(1824).
14 In New York juries simply found nothing to forfeit. J. GOEBEL & T. NAUGHTON,
LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK 712-13, 716 (1944). See also 2 J. KENT, supra
note 38, at 318.
55 Pennsylvania apparently used forfeiture consequent to attainder more widely than
other colonies. See, e.g., Acts of Jan. 12, 1705-06, chs. 116, 120, 125, 2 Pa. Stats. 172, 178,
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and Virginia. 56 However, no colony applied forfeiture consequent
to attainder as severely as England. The acceptance of deodand is
more difficult to assess. 57 In any case, the Crown did not insist on
most forfeitures, perhaps because the proceeds would have gone
to the colonial governments; it did, however, demand adherence
to the Navigation Acts, which by their terms were applicable to
the colonies.58
Forfeiture proceedings brought in America under the Naviga-
tion Acts differed substantially from those in England. 59 Since the
colonies had no exchequer courts (save one short-lived excep-
tion),60 forfeiture suits were initially brought in other common-law
courts.6 1 However, after the turn of the eighteenth century, most
contested suits were brought in the newly-established vice admi-
ralty courts.6 2 Owing to the distance from London and the closed
nature of the British admiralty practice, American forfeiture suits fol-
lowed neither the various Exchequer proceedings nor the admi-
ralty in rem action, but were more of a personal action founded on
foreign attachment. 63 The Crown preferred to sue in the vice ad-
miralty courts, since it could thereby avoid the colonial jury of the
common-law courts.6 4 This practice was bitterly criticized by John
Adams and other Americans, who objected to the denial of trial by
184 (H. Flanders & J. Mitchell eds. 1896). See also Respublica v. Doan, I Dall. (1 U.S.) 86
(Pa. 1784).
5r For a discussion of Virginia's forfeiture law, see A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW IN
COLONIAL VIRGINIA 109 (1930). Some Virginia statutes forfeited the estate of an attainted,
subject to a use in the survivors. Act of March 10, 1655, 1 Va. Stats. 397-98 (Hening ed.
1809); Act of October 18, 1784, 11 Va. Stats. 508 (Hening ed. 1809).
57 Property was sometimes forfeited as deodand in New York. J. GOtBEL & T.
NAUGHTON, supra note 54, at 717. Pennsylvania evidently did not use deodand. S. PENNY-
PACKER, PENNSYLVANIA COLONIAL CASES 70 (1892).
5 See, e.g., 12 Car. 2, c. 18, c. II (1660).
59See generally Wroth, The Massachusetts Vice Admiralty Court and the Federal Admiraly
Jurisdiction, 6 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 250 (1962).
60 In 1685 New York established an Exchequer court that lasted a few years. 1 P.
HAMLIN & C. BAKER, SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW YORK
1691-1704, at 33-36 (1959). See also Surrency, The Courts in the American Colonies, 11 Am. J.
LEGAL HiST. 253, 261 (1967).
6" Wroth, supra note 59, at 257-63. See generally H. CRUMP, COLONIAL ADNIIRALTY
JURISDICTION IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1931); C. UBBELOHDE, THE VIcE-ADMIRALTY
COURTS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1960). For examples of forfeitures brought
under the Navigation Acts in common-law courts, see 1 RECORDS OF THE COURT OF ASSIS-
TANTS OF THE COLONY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY 1630-1692, at 149-50, 160, 170-71,
176-77, 209-10, 220, 342-44, 355-56, 366 (J. Noble ed. 1901); SELECT CASES OF THE
MAYOR'S COURT OF NEW YORK CITY 1674-1784, at 566-648 (R. Morris ed. 1935).
62 H. CRUMP, supra note 61, at 35.
6 Wroth, supra note 59, at 265-67. Such an in personam action is inconsistent with the
personification fiction, which -views the property as the "guilty" object. See notes 89-92 and
accompanying text infra.
64 Wroth, supra note 59, at 257-58.
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jury ordinarily given in Exchequer forfeiture suits. 65 Although the
colonists may have been denied the benefit of a jury, the much
maligned American vice admiralty courts were themselves reluc-
tant to impose forfeitures absent culpability. When the Crown
failed to show fraud, the colonial vice admiralty courts often de-
nied the forfeiture, despite proof of technical violations. 66 In 1773
the Massachusetts Vice Admiralty Court refused to order the for-
feiture of cargo of an innocent shipper for the unlawful acts of the
owner of the ship in which the goods were sent, explaining:
The wisdom or justice of parliament ought never to be so im-
peached, as to suppose that, for the omission of an Owner, the
innocent [shipper] who could not, in the nature of things, be
privy to it, should suffer perhaps to his total ruin. Such a doc-
trine if once established, I imagine, would be very destructive to
trade and Commerce, and therefore instead of promoting the
Public interest, would have a quite contrary effect.
6 7
"See e.g., Advocate General v. Hancock, Quincy 457, 460 (Mass. V. Adm. 1769); 2
LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 194, 200 (L. Wroth & H. Zobel eds. 1965). Despite this
criticism of nonjury trials, the United States Supreme Court in 1769 decided that an action
cognizable in the English Exchequer could be properly tried without a jury in an American
admiralty court, when founded upon a seizure made within the admiralty jurisdiction.
United States v. La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall:) 297 (1796). Chancellor Kent criticized the
decision and expressed doubt that it had been "sufficiently considered." 1 J. KENT, supra
note 38, at 351.
Juries deciding forfeiture cases have tended to mitigate the sanction, often by requir-
ing culpability. See, e.g., 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *302; S. Doc. No. 683, 60th
Cong., 2d Sess. 81-82, 84 (1908). Today there is no constitutional right to trial by jury,
even in forfeitures incurred outside the admiralty jurisdiction. Van Oster v. Kansas, 272
U.S. 465, 469 (1926).
6' For example, in 1740 the New York Vice Admiralty Court denied forfeiture of a
ship because it found that the failure to have a proper registration paper was "wholly
owing to the forgetfulness of the master who was part Owner thereof and without any
Design or Intention of fraud." Kennedy qui tam v. The Silvia, N.Y. V. Adm. Rep. 18
(1740). In another case, the same court was so lenient toward the American owners that
the customs officials appealed to the High Court of Admiralty in London, the only such
appeal ever taken. Brown qui tam v. The New York, N.Y. V. Adm. Rep. 215 (1764), rev'd in
part sub nom. Brown v. Kenyon, Burrell (Marsden ed.) 30, 167 Eng. Rep. 457 (Adm. 1767).
In 1750 this New York court held that the landing of goods occasioned by a shipwreck
should not be considered an "importation" in violation of a customs statute. Kennedy qui
tam v. 96 Pcs of Sail Cloth, N.Y. V. Adm. Rep. 64, 65-66 (1750). More recently, the First
Circuit Court of Appeals refused to read into a customs statute a "highly technical" mean-
ing and upheld a forfeiture incurred when a foreign diamond dealer's commercial airline
flight was temporarily diverted to the United States in bad weather. Leiser v. United States,
234 F.2d 648, 649 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 893 (1956).
67 Dawson v. The Dolphin (Mass. V. Adm. 1773), in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS,
supra note 65, at 232. See also In re One 1965 Ford Mustang, 105 Ariz. 293, 299-300, 463
P.2d 827, 833-34 (1970).
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II
FORFEITURE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
Forfeiture consequent to attainder fell into disrepute in colo-
nial America and did not survive long in the new republic. It de-
prived innocent heirs of their rightful inheritance, and it too easily
dispensed with judicial findings of guilt.68 Accordingly, the Con-
stitution forbade bills of attainder of any kind,69 as well as corrup-
tion of the blood and forfeiture of estate for treason, except during
the life of the person attainted. 70 Moreover, in the Act of April 30,
1790, the first Congress abolished forfeiture of estate and corrup-
tion of the blood for felony.7' A number of states took similar
actions.
7 2
While forfeiture as a consequence of conviction rapidly fell
into disuse, forfeitures of specific property continued to be im-
posed by statute in the same manner as fines and penalties. These
forfeitures were imposed in both criminal and civil proceedings
and could be either in rem or in personam. Classifying the forfei-
ture was often difficult.7 3 Statutory interpretation determined
68 See I J. BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW § 643 (2d ed. Boston 1858) (Ist ed. Boston 1856-58);
2 J. KENT, supra note 38, at 317-18. Another important reason for the disappearance of
forfeiture consequent to attainder was the desire to end all vestiges of the feudal era. See
5 N. DANE, supra note 53, at 35. Pragmatic considerations also played a part. See J. GOEBEL
& T. NAUGHTON, supra note 54, at 716-17. See also note 38 and accompanying text supra.
69 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cf. 3.
70 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
71 1 Stat. 117, c. 9, § 24 (now 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (1970)).
72 See 2 J. KENT, supra notd 38, at 318.
13 A. CONKLING, TREATISE ON THE ORGANIZATION, JURISDICTION, AND PRACTICE OF THE
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 159 (Albany 1831). The Justice Department contends that
no forfeiture has been imposed in a criminal prosecution since 1790 (Justice Dep't Memo
No. 828, supra note 12), overlooking a leading federal case holding that forfeiture under
an embargo statute had to be imposed in a criminal action. United States v. Mann, 26 F.
Cas. 1153, 1155 (C.C.D.N.H. 1812) (No. 15,718) (Story, J.). Some of the more important
federal cases discussing imposition of forfeiture in a criminal prosecution include Origet v.
United States, 125 U.S. 240 (1888); United States v. Three Tons of Coal, 28 F. Cas. 149,
153-54 (E.D. Wis. 1875) (No. 16,515); The Amy Warwick, I F. Cas. 808, 811 (D. Mass.
1862) (No. 342), aff'd sub nom. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863); Greene v.
Briggs, 10 F. Cas. 1135 (C.C.D.R.I. 1852) (No. 5,764). Other relevant federal cases include
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 675 (1887) (dissenting opinion, Field, J.); United States v.
Claflin, 97 U.S. 546 (1878); The Harbour Trader, 42 F.2d 858 (2d Cir. 1930); United
States v. Mynderse, 27 F. Cas. 50 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1870) (No. 15,850); 17 Op. Att'y Gen.
282 (1882).
Although many states have statutory or constitutional provisions similar to the 1790
Act (see, e.g., 2 J. KENT, supra note 38, at 318), the following cases allow the imposition of a
forfeiture in a criminal prosecution: Rubino v. State, 391 P.2d 946 (Alaska 1964); People v.
Treadway, 55 Cal. App. 3d 15, 127 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1975); Boles v. Lynde, I Root 195
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which proceeding was appropriate, and also whether the govern-
ment's interest attached at the time of condemnation, seizure, or
commission of the offense. The established rule was "[t]hat in the
absence of any express terms in the statute declaring an instan-
taneous forfeiture, the forfeiture relates to the time of seizure
only. 7 4 It was considered impermissible for the government's title
to vest, absent a judicial proceeding. 75
The usual forfeiture proceeding in the federal courts was in
rem, 76 since federal forfeiture statutes were largely patterned on
the English navigation and customs statutes, violations of which
were cognizable in the Exchequer.7 7 American judges were even
more reluctant than their English counterparts to impose liability
(Conn. 1790); Armbruster v. Behan, 3 Orl. App. 184 (La. App. 1906) (prior cases re-
viewed); State v. Adams, 78 Me. 486, 7 A. 267 (1886); Commonwealth v. Certain Intoxicat-
ing Liquors, 80 Mass. (14 Gray) 375 (1860); Fisher v. McGirr, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 1 (1854);
Neal v. Morse, 134 Mich. 186, 96 N.W. 14 (1903); City of Duluth v. Cerveny, 218 Minn.
511, 16 N.W.2d 779 (1944); McConnell v. McKillip, 71 Neb. 712, 99 N.W. 505 (1904);
State v. McConnell, 70 N.H. 158, 46 A. 458 (1900); Woods v. Cottrell, 55 W. Va. 476, 482,
47 S.E. 275, 278 (1904) (differences between common law and statutory criminal forfei-
tures discussed); State v. Roggensack, 15 Wis. 2d 625, 113 N.W.2d 389 (1962); State v.
Peterson, 201 Wis. 20, 229 N.W. 48 (1930). The following state statutes direct or allow
forfeitures in criminal proceedings: ME. REV. STAT. tit. 12, § 4508 (1974); MICH. STAT.
ANN. §§ 27A.4801-.4805 (1975); MINN. STAT. § 574.35 (1976); Mo. REV. STAT. § 545.020
(1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-14-01 (1975); TEN. CODE ANN. § 40.3206 (1976); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 7171 (1974); Wis. STAT. § 288.01 (1976). See note 162 infra.
For treatise discussions of the subject, see 1 J. BIsHOP, supra note 68, at §§ 629, 693a;
25 C.J. Fines, Forfeitures and Penalties § 57 (1921); 5 N. DANE, supra note 53, at 3-4, 11,
251-52. See also CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2921 (1862) (remarks of Senator
Browning); id. at 2960, 2962 (remarks of Senator Cowan).
11 United States v. 396 Barrels Distilled Spirits, 28 F. Cas. 121, 125 (E.D. Mo. 1866)
(No. 16,503). Today the rule is always relation back to the time of the offense. See Florida
Dealers & Growers Bank v. United States, 279 F.2d 673, 676 (5th Cir. 1960).
In United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 13 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398 (1814), Justice Story,
in dissent, argued for a presumption against relation back to the time of the offense.
Looking to the vast extent of commercial transfers, the favor with which
navigation and trade are fostered in modern times, and the extreme difficulty of
ascertaining latent defects of title, it seems difficult to resist the impression that
the present is a case which requires the application of the milder rule of the law.
If the principle contended for by the government be admitted in its full ex-
tent, it will be found very difficult to bound it.
Id. at 416. Present cases incorrectly rely on 1960 Bags of Coffee as establishing a general rule
of relation back to the time of the offense. The general rule, however, was no relation back
without clear statutory direction. See, e.g., United States v. 396 Barrels Distilled Spirits,
supra. See also note 37 and accompanying textsupra.
'- Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246, 312 (1818); 2 J. BOUVIER, INSTITUTES OF
Aa1ERMcA LAW 147 (Philadelphia 1854). According to a Kentucky case, such action would
constitute a legislative bill of attainder. Gaines v. Buford, 31 Ky. (1 Dana) 481, 509 (1833).
76 2 J. BouvIER, supra note 75, at 147; 5 N. DANE, supra note 53, at 11.
77 See, e.g., Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, §§ 13, 22, 27, 28, 67, 1 Stat. 145, 157, 161, 163,
176; Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §§ 12, 36, 1 Stat. 29, 39, 47.
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in the absence of fault. For example, necessity was a good plea to
violations of the embargo acts.78 Other forfeiture statutes were
strictly construed so as to avoid imposing liability for blameless
acts, 79 or were held not to relate back so as to avoid depriving an
innocent bona fide purchaser of his property."'
A. Early Constitutional Challenges
In 1827 the use of the in rem action to impose a forfeiture was
challenged in the Supreme Court case of The Palmyra.8 ' The owner
contended that a forfeiture could not be imposed in rem until he
had been first convicted in a criminal prosecution. Justice Story,
speaking for the Court, rejected the argument and held that when
a federal court was properly sitting either as a court of admiralty or
as a court of exchequer, no prior conviction was necessary.82 In-
deed, Justice Story noted, since neither an exchequer nor an ad-
miralty court had criminal jurisdiction, no conviction of the owner
was even possible. Basing his conclusions on "a fair interpretation
of the legislative intention apparent in ... the enactments
8 3 of
admiralty and exchequer in rem forfeiture statutes, Justice Story
held that the "proceeding in rem stands independent of, and wholly
unaffected by any criminal proceeding in personam [since] . . .
[b]oth in England and America, the jurisdiction over proceedings
in rem, is usually vested in different courts from those exercising
criminal jurisdiction. '84 Justice Story justified the imposition of an
in rem forfeiture in admiralty and exchequer cases on the long
history surrounding the English exchequer proceeding and on the
fiction that "[t]he thing is here primarily considered as the offend-
er, or rather the offense is attached primarily to the thing ....
But he neither elaborated on the personification fiction nor dis-
cussed the appropriateness of an in rem forfeiture, other than in
78 See Brig Struggle v. United States, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 71 (1815); Brig James Wells v.
United States, I1 U.S. (7 Cranch) 22 (1812). An exception of necessity would often be
implied even if none were stated in the relevant statute. The William Gray, 29 F. Cas. 1300
(C.G.S.D.N.Y. 1810) (No. 17,694).
79 United States v. The Penelope, 27 F. Gas. 486 (D. Pa. 1806) (No. 16,024).
8" United States v. The Anthony Mangin, 24 F. Cas. 833 (D. Md. 1802) (No. 14,461).
The Federal Cases compilation names the judge and court incorrectly; see the original re-
port in 2 Pet. Adm. 452 (1802).
"1 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
12 Id. at 14-15. For a discussion of the federal court sitting as a court of exchequer, see
C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 137-53 (1943); United States v. 422 Casks of
Wine, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 547 (1828) (Story, J.).
83 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 15.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 14.
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admiralty and exchequer proceedings. Further, Justice Story ex-
pressly limited his holding to "cases of this nature. '8 6
In 1844 in United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 87 a determined
argument was made against the imposition of vicarious liability for
the unauthorized acts of the master. The owner of the forfeited
armed merchantman presented an appealing case-he was admit-
tedly innocent of any wrongdoing. 88 The shipowner's attorney ar-
gued that forfeiture liability should be imposed only for acts within
the scope of the master's authority, as was generally the case in
other areas of employer liability. At that time, even the unau-
thorized acts of one part owner of a ship would not subject the
interests of the other part owners to condemnation. 9 The ship-
owner's counsel also argued that to impose a forfeiture would
punish an innocent party for the crime of another. The Supreme
Court rejected both arguments, explaining that the shipowner
must accept complete liability for all acts of the master. Justice
Story, speaking for the Court, justified this result on public policy
grounds, and used the personification fiction to rationalize his de-
cision:
The vessel which commits the aggression is treated as the of-
fender, as the guilty instrument or thing to which the forfeiture
attaches, without any reference whatsoever to the character or
conduct of the owner .... It is not an uncommon course in the
admiralty ... to treat the vessel... as the offender .... And this
is done from the necessity of the case, as the only adequate
8 Id. at 15. Justice Story may have been partially motivated to uphold the in rem
proceeding because of his belief that forfeitures under revenue and duty acts should be
construed more broadly than those under embargo acts, to which he would have applied
the strict construction given penal statutes. See Taylor v. United States, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
197, 205 (1845); United States v. Breed, 24 F. Cas. 1222, 1224 (C.C.D. Mass. 1832) (No.
14,638). During Justice Story's lifetime customs duties usually provided from 80% to 90%
of federal revenues. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS
OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 33, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 712 (1960).
Contrary to present interpretations of The Palmyra, as broadly authorizing in rem pro-
ceedings for any forfeiture (see, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S.
663, 684 (1974)), contemporary observers saw no expansion of prior law. See, e.g., United
States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 228 (1844) (government attorney cited
The Palmyra for proposition that no prior conviction of owner was necessary where pun-
ishment was limited to forfeiture).
8 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844).
88 The owner had the misfortune to hire a master who became mentally unbalanced
shortly after the voyage began and fired on several ships that crossed the Malek Adhel's
course. Id. at 212-19.
89 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP AS A BRANCH OF COMMERCIAL
AND MARITIME JURISPRUDENCE § 453, at 636 (Boston 1841).
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means of suppressing the offence or wrong, or insuring an in-
demnity to the injured party.9 "
Although Justice Story rested his decision on policy grounds, sub-
sequent cases to this day have relied on the fiction to explain all
forfeiture law.9' In contrast to later, more expansive -interpreta-
tions, the fiction was initially thought to limit the reach of civil
forfeitures .92
Civil forfeitures are difficult to classify. They do not fit into
the traditional division between crime and civil tort.93 Bishop ob-
served that the civil forfeiture "is neither a punishment for crime,
even though a crime is committed when it is incurred; nor a dam-
age awarded for a civil injury, even though a civil liability follows
the act which produces it.''94 The justification for civil forfeiture
has traditionally rested on the power of the government to regulate
and protect its revenue. Accordingly, the first American civil for-
feitures were patterned on those cognizable in the English Exche-
quer, the Crown's revenue court. In America, however, these ac-
tions had to be fitted into a unified federal judicial system that
lacked a revenue court. In England, whether a given forfeiture suit
required civil or criminal proceedings was not an issue-the issue
was simply whether the action could properly be heard by the
Exchequer. In the unified American court system, it was necessary
to determine the appropriate procedure for exchequer-type forfei-
tures. However, a 1796 Supreme Court decision,95 holding that
certain exchequer forfeitures could be imposed in civil in rem pro-
ceedings, created a problem. For if an exchequer forfeiture could
be imposed in a civil in rem action, limits on the use of the in rem
procedure had to be established. In England, the jurisdictional
restrictions on the Exchequer and Admiralty courts imposed the
necessary limitation,96 but the American system contained no com-
9a 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 233. Story elaborated at length "upon the general policy of [the
maritime] law, which looks to the instrument itself, used as the means of the mischief, as
the best and surest pledge for the compensation and indemnity to the injured party." Id. at
234. 91 E.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683-88 (1974).
92 See notes 97-100 and accompanying text infra.
93See note 14supra.
94 1 J. BISHOP, supra note 68, at § 698.
95 United States v. La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297 (1796) (forfeiture of vessel for
exporting arms and ammunition in violation of federal law). See notes 65, 81-86 and ac-
companying text supra.
96 For example, of the common-law courts, only the Exchequer exercised in rem juris-
diction over property other than realty. L. HARPER, supra note 41, at 113. For a discussion
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parable limitation. Thus, it was necessary to distinguish the primar-
ily regulatory exchequer-type civil forfeiture from the primarily
punitive forfeiture imposed in criminal prosecutions. When would
a forfeiture proceeding require a personal prosecution of the
owner? The personification fiction was thought to provide an an-
swer.
The personification fiction required that the property itself
furnish all the material evidence of its own condemnation. An in
rem forfeiture was, therefore, permissible either in the case of
property so dangerous that its possession was completely prohib-
ited, such as contraband, or in the case of normally harmless
property found endangering the public, such as a ship committing
piracy. 97 Thus the personification fiction enabled the courts to
conceptualize civil forfeitures as in rem proceedings not involving
any punishment of the owner. Justice Field gave perhaps the best
statement of this limitation on in rem forfeiture:
The thing is the instrument of wrong, and is forfeited by reason
of the unlawful use made of it, or the unlawful condition in
which it is placed. And generally the thing, thus subject to sei-
zure, itself furnishes the evidence for its own condemnation.
Thus, goods found smuggled . .. prove of themselves nearly all
that is desired to establish the right of the government to de-
mand their confiscation .... And it is true that . . . criminal
proceedings will also lie against the smuggler, . . . and that the
proceedings in rem are wholly independent of, and unaffected
by, the criminal proceedings against the person. But in the two
cases the proof is entirely different. In the one case, there must
be proof that the thing proceeded against was subjected to some
unlawful use, or was found in some unlawful condition. In the
other case the personal guilt of the party must be established,
of the revenue jurisdiction of the Exchequer, see 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 32, at
238-39. See generally authorities cited in note 46 supra.
97 The latter was sometimes analogized to nuisance. Chief Justice Shaw of the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court explained:
[The property] has fallen into the hands of those who have made, and intend to
make, the injurious or dangerous use of it, of which the public have a right to
complain, and from which they have a right to be relieved. Therefore, as well to
abate the nuisance, as to punish the offending or careless owner, the property
may be justly declared forfeited ....
Fisher v. McGirr, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 1, 28 (1854). See Our House No. 2 v. State, 4 Greene
172 (Iowa 1853); Gray v. Kimball, 42 Me. 299 (1856); Woods v. Cottrell, 55 W. Va. 476
482, 47 S.E. 275, 278 (1904); CONG. GLoBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2962 (1862) (remarks of
Senator Cowan); cf., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Sinclair v. Croom, 217 N.C.
526, 8 S.E.2d 834 (1940) (nuisance abatement discussed as a property "taking" within the
Constitution).
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and when condemnation is founded upon such guilt, it must be
preceded by due conviction of the offender, according to the
forms prescribed by the Constitution."
Therefore, a primarily remedial forfeiture could still be so penal as
to require a personal action against the owner, if the forfeiture de-
pended upon proof of the owner's guilt. As Judge Sprague ob-
served: "Confiscations of property, not for any use that has been
made of it, which go not against an offending thing, but are in-
flicted for the personal delinquency of the owner, are punitive;
and punishment should be inflicted only upon due conviction of
personal guilt."99 Accordingly, statutes that imposed forfeitures
in rem as punishment were found unconstitutional.""
B. The Civil War Confiscation Acts
The Civil War brought about a radical change in the law of
forfeiture. Congress abandoned pre-War constitutional limitations
on forfeiture and approved the use of in rem proceedings to im-
pose purely punitive sanctions. Shortly after the War began, it
became clear that traditional treason statutes were inadequate to
punish the Southern rebels; most rebels were safely behind Con-
91 Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 321-22 (1871) (dissenting opinion).
Justice Field's example illustrating in rem forfeiture is similar to the situation in United
States v. Hall, 521 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1975). See notes 149-58 and accompanying text infra.
But in Hall, the forfeiture by statute required proof of personal guilt. See notes 168-87 and
accompanying text infra. Thus, by Field's reasoning, forfeiture requires a criminal prose-
cution.
99 The Amy Warwick, 1 F. Cas. 808, 811 (D. Mass. 1862) (No. 842), affd sub nom. The
Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863). Bishop said of the problem:
And, disguise the matter as we may, under whatever form of words, if the intent
which the owner of property carries in his bosom is the gist of the thing on which
the forfeiture turns, then the question is one of the criminal law, and the forfei-
ture is a penalty imposed for crime, instead of being [a regulatory] forfeiture ....
1 J. BIsHOP, supra note 68, at § 703.
"o" Greene v. Briggs, 10 F. Cas. 1135 (C.C.D.R.I. 1852) (No. 5,764); Fisher v. McGirr,
67 Mass. (1 Gray) 1, 36-41 (1854); Hibbard v. People, 4 Mich. 125 (1856). There is some
intimation in these and other cases that in rem actions might have been permissible if
accompanied by the safeguards of a criminal prosecution. In Iowa, such in rem suits were
routinely held subject to the rules of criminal suits. State v. Arlen, 71 Iowa 216, 32 N.W.
267 (1887); Part of Lot No. 294 v. State, I Iowa 506 (1855). However, the court in State v.
Brennan's Liquors, 25 Conn. 278 (1858), upheld a similar in rem suit, and dismissed due
process concerns by noting:
It is to be presumed that the magistrate will discharge the duty conferred
upon him properly; that he will not decree a forfeiture, if the party in interest is
not before the court, without giving him due notice to appear; or if it should
appear that the person having it, with intent to sell, was a mere trespasser, and
the true owner was chargeable with no fault or neglect.
Id. at 286.
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federate lines, protected from treason prosecutions. Nevertheless,
many Confederates owned property in the North that was subject
to confiscation. If the Confederacy had been a foreign power,
there would have been few constitutional obstacles to confiscating
enemy property. The rebels, however, were considered citizens,
not aliens, and were entitled to full constitutional rights. x " There-
fore, in absentia prosecutions were forbidden.'11 2 The congres-
sional solution for this problem was a proposed confiscation bill
permitting in rem forfeitures.
The advocates of confiscation contended that forfeitures
under the customs statutes demonstrated that all in rem forfeitures
constituted due process of law.'113 The opponents argued that pro-
ceedings under the proposed bill would constitute criminal pros-
ecutions of the rebel property owners, since confiscation could
occur only upon a finding that the owner was guilty of treason.
11 4
One Senator noted that the choice of the in rem proceeding was no
more than "hocus pocus" designed to avoid the constitutional re-
quirements of a criminal trial. 15 If the government could proceed
in rem to punish treason, nothing would stop it from proceeding
similarly to punish lesser crimes . 116 The proponents of the bill
urged the necessity of the hour, and countered that without in rem
forfeiture the rebels would go "forever unwhipped."'11 7 Congress
""See J. RANDALL, THE CONFISCATION OF PROPERTY DURING THE CIVIL WAR 19-23
(1913).
102 Ordinary civil condemnation of rebel property was blocked by the requirement of
adequate compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Criminal prosecutions were prevented by
such constitutional guarantees as confrontation by one's accusers and trial in the district of
the offense. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, ci. 3. See also U.S. CoNST.
art. I1, § 3.
103 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1762 (1862) (remarks of Senator Davis); id. at
2294 (remarks of Rep. Wallace); L. DAY, supra note 25, at 51-55 (New Orleans 1870). Day
concluded that "[p]roceedings in rem, then, for a forfeiture, although the forfeiture is in-
tended as a punishment by the law-maker for the violation of law, are not to be regarded
as criminal, but as civil proce.edings." Id. at 55 (emphasis in original). The opponents raised
the personification fiction to distinguish the proposed bill from the customs forfeitures,
since few confiscation supporters could reasonably assert that the proposed bill was di-
rected against guilty property. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1574 (1862)
(remarks of Senator Henderson). The proponents answered that forfeiture of rebel prop-
erty without conviction of the owner rested "[n]ot upon a mere fiction of law, but upon a
great public necessity." Id. at 2239 (remarks of Rep. Noell). The personification fiction was
attacked as a recent invention. L. DAY, supra, at 65.
104 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1574 (1862) (remarks of Senator Henderson);
id. at 1809 (remarks of Senator Collamer); id. at 2921 (remarks of Senator Browing); id. at
2960 (remarks of Senator Cowan); id. at App. 202 (remarks of Rep. Thomas); id. at App.
267 (remarks of Rep. Walton); id. at App. 304 (remarks of Senator Howard).
..5 Id. at 1809 (remarks of Senator Collamer).
I(H Id. at 1859 (remarks of Senator Browning).
107 Id. at App. 167 (remarks of Rep. Babbitt). Other advocates of confiscation argued
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debated the bill throughout the spring of 1862 and narrowly
passed the measure in the early summer.'1 8 Even then the struggle
was not over, since President Lincoln threatened a veto.' 9 Con-
gress responded by passing an "explanatory" Joint Resolution
which met one of the President's objections, and Lincoln finally
signed the bill.""
The Confiscation Acts were soon challenged. In 1863 the Su-
preme Court of Kentucky held the 1862 Act unconstitutional, pre-
dicting that "[t]hese [in rem] proceedings may to-day be the en-
gines of punishment to the rebels, but, in the future, they may be
the instruments of oppression, injustice and tyranny ....
Nevertheless, the prosecutions continued, and in 1870 three con-
stitutional challenges finally reached the United States Supreme
Court. The Court considered the cases for over a year, and heard
arguments twice in all three. In 1871, the Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of the in rem proceedings, not on due process
grounds, but as an exercise of the war power in taking enemy
property.' 2 Justice Field, joined by Justice Clifford, dissented.
They argued that the forfeitures punished offenders for treason
and, therefore, could only be imposed in criminal prosecutions. 1 3
Despite Justice Field's dissent, and regardless of the majority's
rationale, the broad scope of in rem forfeiture had been estab-
lished. The result was a revolution in forfeiture law that persists to
this day-use of the in rem action without constitutional limita-
tion.' 4 It is unlikely that such a change would have occurred had it
not been for the passions raised by the Civil War.
that the bill did not fall within constitutional limitations because it was a measure to sup-
press rebellion and not to punish traitors. Id. at 2294 (remarks of Rep. Wallace); The Right
to Conficate and Emancipate, 24 MONTHLY LAw REP. 645, 650-51 (1862).
"'1 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2361, 3006 (1862). The principal measure was
the Act of July 17, 1862, 12 Stat. 589. See the related Act of Aug. 6, 1861, 21 Stat. 319, 50
U.S.C. § 212 (1970).
109 President Lincoln had two primary objections: the confiscation was not limited to
the lifetime of the traitor and the "act, in rem, forfeits property for the ingredients of
treason without a conviction of the supposed criminal, or a personal hearing given him in
any proceeding." CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 3406 (1862) (text of President's pre-
pared veto message).
10 The Joint Resolution limited the forfeiture to a life estate, but did not address Presi-
dent Lincoln's second objection. Id. at App. 423 (text of resolution). For a general discus-
sion of the legislative history of the confiscation bill, see J. RANDALL, supra note 101, at
9-12.
.. Norris v. Doniphan, 61 Ky. (4 Met.) 385, 426 (1863).
12 Tyler v. Defrees, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 331 (1871); Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11
Wall.) 268 (1871); McVeigh v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 259 (1871). See also 3 C.
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 138-39 (1922).
"' 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 355-56. See note 98 and accompanying text supra.
114 During the congressional debates, Senator Browning had predicted that if the
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C. Forfeiture Law after the Civil War
In personam forfeiture prosecutions disappeared in the fed-
eral system shortly after the advent of punitive in rem suits.1" The
conventional view that forfeiture is a sanction necessarily imposed
in rem developed during this period. Within three decades after
the Civil War, the Supreme Court presumed that a "proceeding to
enforce the forfeiture against the res named must be a proceeding
in rem and a civil action." '  The disappearance of in personam
forfeiture proceedings is not surprising for a number of reasons.
In upholding the Confiscation Acts, the Supreme Court had ac-
cepted that punishment might be imposed in rem. 1 7 Thus little
reason remained for the more complicated in personam suit.
Furthermore, since most of the pre-Civil War forfeitures had been
in rem regulatory proceedings, a strong tradition of in personam
forfeiture had not developed in the federal system. Finally, after
the Civil War Congress usually provided an in rem proceeding for
any new punitive forfeiture legislation."18 Thus, by the turn of the
century it was established doctrine that all forfeitures should be
imposed in civil in rem proceedings.
Imposing punitive forfeitures in civil in rem suits did not, at
first, obscure their character as punishment. For some years the
federal courts continued to distinguish between punitive and re-
medial forfeitures. The punitive in rem forfeiture required proof
of the owner's criminal intent and entitled the owner to many of
confiscation bill were passed, "a total revolution [will be] wrought in our criminal juris-
prudence, and, in despite of all the safeguards of the Constitution, proceedings in personam
for the punishment of crime may be totally ignored, and punishment inflicted by proceed-
ing against property alone." CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2921 (1862) (remarks of
Senator Browning).
115 The author has been unable to find any reported federal in personam forfeiture
proceedings after the Civil War and prior to the 1970 Organized Crime and Drug Control
Acts.
116 United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475, 478 (1896). The language of the statute in
Zucker was virtually identical to that in United States v. Mann, 26 F. Cas. 1153 (C.C.D.N.H.
1812) (No. 15,718). In Mann, Justice Story had held that the statute required a criminal
prosecution. See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
As late as 1888, the Supreme Court was willing to hear argument that a particular
forfeiture required a criminal prosecution. Origet v. United States, 125 U.S. 240, 245-46
(1888). However, by the 1890's some lower court judges were openly hostile to forfeiture
in a criminal prosecution; one judge remarked that it "would be, if not wholly impractic-
able, at least productive of great confusion." United States v. A Lot of Jewelry, 59 F. 684,
686 (E.D.N.Y. 1894). By 1906 a Louisiana judge felt compelled to write a lengthy opinion
in order to justify any forfeiture in a criminal prosecution. See Armbruster v. Behan, 3 Orl.
App. 184 (La. App. 1906).
7 See notes 112-14 and accompanying text supra.
' E.g., Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 6 (1970).
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the constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants. In
1886 in Boyd v. United States,"t 9 the Supreme Court held that a
property owner could claim the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination in an in rem proceeding against his property.
The Court explained that "proceedings instituted for the purpose
of declaring the forfeiture of a man's property by reason of offences
committed by him, though they may be civil in form, are in their
nature criminal."'' 2 The Court, therefore, held that since
suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred by the commission of
offences against the law, are of this quasi-criminal nature....
they are within the reason of criminal proceedings for all the
purposes of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, and of
that portion of the Fifth Amendment which declares that no per-
son shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself .... 121
Similarly, in Coffey v. United States'2 2 the Supreme Court decided
that an acquittal in a criminal prosecution barred a subsequent
punitive in rem suit when "all that is imposed by the statute, as a
consequence of guilt, is a punishment therefor."' 23 In Osborn v.
19 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
I'l Id. at 634 (emphasis added). The Court continued:
If an indictment had been presented against the claimants, upon conviction the
forfeiture of the goods could have been included in the judgment. If the govern-
ment prosecutor elects to waive an indictment, and to file a civil information
against the claimants-that is, civil in form-can he by this device take from the
proceeding its criminal aspect... ? This cannot be.
Id. See United States v. A Lot of Jewelry, 59 F. 684, 691 (E.D.N.Y. 1894); cases cited in
note 123 infra; Annot., 29 L.R.A. 811, 820-22 (1895). See generally 12 R.C.L. Forfeitures
§§ 9-14 (1916). See also note 100 and accompanying textsupra.
121 116 U.S. at 634. Boyd does not make a clear distinction between punitive and reme-
dial in rem forfeitures. But see One Lot Emerald Cut Stones & One Ring v. United States,
409 U.S. 232, 236 n.6 (1972) (Boyd discussed; distinction supported). Other cases, both in
the Supreme Court and the lower courts, clearly make this distinction. See authorities cited
in note 120 supra and notes 122-25 infra.
The Boyd problem would not have arisen had the pre-Civil War limitations on in rem
forfeiture been maintained. Under those limitations, if it had been necessary to compel
testimony from the owner, then an in rem action would have been impermissible. See notes
97-100 and accompanying textsupra.
Although Justice Brandeis once said that the Boyd case "will be remembered as long as
civil liberty lives in the United States" (Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928)
(dissenting opinion)), Boyd is now in trouble. The Supreme Court has said that the Boyd
holding would be overruled today for its interpretation of the right against self-incrim-
ination. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 405-08 (1976). Boyd's treatment of forfeiture,
however, is still good law. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 700
(1965).
122 116 U.S. 436 (1886).
123 Id. at 443. For cases and an annotation discussing former jeopardy in a subsequent
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United States, 124 the Court held that a pardon remitted any punitive
forfeiture incurred, since "the penalty of forfeiture annexed to the
commission of the offence must fall with the pardon of the offence
itself."'125 In Stone v. United States126 the Court emphasized that the
safeguards surrounding a punitive in rem suit "can have no appli-
cation in a civil [remedial] case not involving any question of crimi-
nal intent or forfeiture for prohibited acts."' 2 7 Finally, in United
States v. Zucker,' 28 the Court curtailed the protections available to
the owner in a punitive in rem suit by ruling that the sixth
amendment guarantees did not apply to in rem forfeiture suits.
Reversing a lower court decision, the Court held that in rem suits
were not "criminal prosecutions" within the meaning of the sixth
amendment even though the same suit could be a "criminal case"
within the meaning of the fifth amendment.
29
Limitations on punitive in rem forfeitures collapsed early in
the twentieth century when the Supreme Court adopted the per-
sonification fiction of guilty property. 3" The personification fic-
punitive in rem suit, see Stone v. United States, 167 U.S. 178 (1897); United States v.
Seattle Brewing & Malting Co., 135 F. 597 (D. Wash. 1905); United States v. Jaedicke,
73 F. 100, 103 (D. Kan. 1896); United States v. Three Copper Stills, 47 F. 495, 499 (D. Ky.
1890); State ex rel. Remley v. Meek, 112 Iowa 338, 84 N.W. 3 (1900); Annot., II L.R.A.
(n.s.) 653, 667-69 (1906).
The Coffey case has also been criticized. See McKeehan v. United States, 438 F.2d 739,
747 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. One 1953 Oldsmobile, 222 F.2d 668, 670 (4th Cir.
1955); Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 1137 (1953).
124 91 U.S. 474 (1876).
125 Id. at 477. If "[t]he questions of [the owner's] guilt and ownership were... funda-
mental in the case," the ordinary finality rules did not apply, since "[t]he case is wholly
unlike a proceeding purely in rem." McVeigh v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 259,
266-67 (1871). Further, such a punitive in rem forfeiture might be limited to "that which
belonged to the offending person." Day v. Micou, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 160, 161 (1873). This
line of cases was attacked by admirers of the in rem -action even before Boyd and Coffey
were decided. See R. WAPLES, A TREATISE ON PROCEEDINGS IN REM § 252 (1882).
Yet the lower courts refused to find the punitive in rem forfeiture of such a criminal
character as to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, "notwithstanding [that the actioni
is essentially criminal and intended to punish a crime." 3880 Boxes of Opium v. United
States, 23 F. 367, 395 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883). See also Clark, supra note 14, at 393-94 n.45.
126 167 U.S. 178 (1897) (action to recover value of timber unlawfully cut on govern-
ment land).
27 Mid. at 188.The distinction between punitive and remedial forfeitures continues to
have some vitality in applying the Coffey doctrine. See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones & One
Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 236 n.6 (1972); McKeehan v. United States, 438 F.2d
739, 747 (6th Cir. 1971).
128 161 U.S. 475 (1896).
129 Id. at 480-82. The Court noted that "[t]he Sixth Amendment relates to a prosecu-
tion of an accused person which is technically criminal in its nature." Id. at 481.
31' See notes 138-42 and accompanying text infra. It is not surprising that punitive in
rem forfeiture disappeared as a general principle, given the difficulty of reconciling an in
rem action with punitive ends. One commentator observed that one line of Supreme Court
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tion, as a guiding principle, had little place immediately after the
Civil War, since both punitive and remedial forfeitures were im-
posed in rem. Indeed, in Boyd the Supreme Court explicitly re-
jected the notion that property could be considered guilty.13'
Nevertheless, the personification fiction was gaining acceptance in
admiralty law.' 32 Toward the turn of the century, therefore, gov-
ernment prosecutors urged reliance on the fiction to support a
broader imposition of vicarious liability.' 33
In the lower courts, the government contended that the forfei-
ture was solely a punishment of "guilty" property and not of its
owner. Therefore, the use to which the property was put would
determine the forfeiture question, regardless of the owner's guilt
or innocence. Absent Supreme Court authority, however, a num-
ber of lower courts rejected the personification fiction and in-
sisted on explicit statutory authority to justify a forfeiture of one
person's property because of the use made of it by another.134 The
courts appeared to be on the verge of adopting a more conser-
vative theory of vicarious liability.'3 5 Although broader than the
pre-Civil War approach, 36 this conservative theory required either
that the actor be an agent of the owner or, alternatively, that the
cases "emphasizes that forfeitures are in rem and therefore ... necessarily remedial and not
punitive. The second line emphasizes that forfeitures do serve a punitive and deterrent
function, despite their in rem procedural nature." Clark, supra note 14, at 476.
131 116 U.S. at 637. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
132 G. GILMORE & C. BLAcK, supra note 22, at 510.
133 See Annot., 1916E L.R.A. 343. In Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395
(1878), the Court held a lessor vicariously liable for the acts of his lessee. Although Dobbins's
Distillery is often regarded as supporting virtually unlimited vicarious liability, the Court
was careful to note that the particular statute involved was not punitive in nature and that
the forfeiture was incurred "without any regard whatsoever to the personal misconduct or
responsibility of the owner." Id. at 401. Nevertheless, Dobbins's Distillery did mark a broad
extension of vicarious liability under remedial forfeiture statutes. The Court suggested that
holding the lessor liabile for the acts of his lessee was analogous to past instances of vicari-
ous liability of a shipowner for the acts of his master. Id. at 400, 404. The analogy, how-
ever, is not well taken, since the master of a ship occupied a very special position of trust
with respect to the shipowner, which does not exist between lessor and lessee. See notes
43-44, 89-91 and accompanying text supra.
134 In 1899 the Fourth Circuit explicitly rejected the fiction and held that "it is the
duty of the court to inquire into the facts; and, if it appears clearly that the owner [is not]
• • . in some way justly chargeable with blame or negligence, he ought not to suffer
[forfeiture] .... " United States v. Two Barrels of Whiskey, 96 F. 479, 481 (4th Cir. 1899).
See The Cargo ex Lady Essex, 39 F. 765 (E.D. Mich. 1889). In 1920 the Oklahoma Su-
preme Court observed that "both the state and federal courts have refused to order a
forfeiture of property of an innocent person because used by others to unlawfully transport
liquors, except where the Legislature had expressly and unequivocally declared [it].
One Hudson Super-Six Auto. v. State, 77 Okla. 130, 136, 187 P. 806, 813 (1920).
135 See Annot., 1916E L.R.A. 343; Hoover v. People, -68 Colo. 249, 187 P. 531 (1920).
1
3
6 See notes 93-100 and accompanying text supra.
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owner know and consent to the use of his property in an activity
that might expose it to forfeiture. The conflict between the gov-
ernment's theory and the conservative theory came to a head with
the passage of numerous liquor prohibition statutes during Presi-
dent Wilson's administration. In 1920 the Colorado Supreme
Court, construing one of these statutes, adopted the conservative
theory. The court noted that under the government's position:
I forfeit title to my automobile if I overtake, on the road, a man
with a bottle of whiskey in his pocket, invite him to ride and he
accepts the invitation. He is using my automobile to transport
whisky unlawfully. I have not consented to it and do not know
it-but . . . that will not avail me .... Is this result absurd? It
surely is; but it is a conclusion inevitable from the argument that
is put before us in this case.
137
Scarcely a year later, the government's theory triumphed. The
United States Supreme Court, in J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v.
United States,' 38 relied on analogy to deodand' 39 and the personifi-
cation fiction to adopt the broad theory of vicarious liability under
forfeiture statutes. The Court specifically rejected the conservative
view.'"" The "absurd" result that the Colorado Supreme Court
predicted as inevitable has followed.' From 1921 to the present,




"CRIMINAL FORFEITURE" AND THE FEDERAL RULES
In 1970 Congress took a new approach to forfeiture in enact-
ing the Organized Crime Control Act. 143 The Act makes illegal
certain racketeering involvement in commercial enterprises and
punishes violators with up to twenty years imprisonment, a $25,000
fine, and the forfeiture of all interests held in contravention of the
13' Hoover v. People, 68 Colo. 249, 254-55, 187 P. 531, 533 (1920).
138 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
"9 See notes 24-27 and accompanying text supra.
,4, 254 U.S. at 510-12.
41 United States v. Addison, 260 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1958); United States v. One 1957
Oldsmobile Auto., 256 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1958). See note 44 supra.
141 One student author has correctly observed that "[t]he law changed little in the half
century after Grant Co. as courts continually, though often unwillingly, enforced forfeitures
against blameless parties." 60 CORNELL L. REv. 467, 469-70 (1974).
143 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1970).
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statute. 44 In the same session, Congress also passed the Com-
prehensive Drug Prevention and Control Act,145 which similarly
employs forfeiture. Congress envisioned these forfeitures as sanc-
tions imposed as part of the criminal prosecution. 46 To make pos-
sible the imposition of forfeiture in a criminal prosecution, Con-
gress approved amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The Rules now apply to all "criminal forfeitures" and
exclude from their scope only "civil forfeiture[s].' 47 Previously,
the Rules had excluded all forfeitures in accord with the conven-
tional view that forfeiture is necessarily civil and in rem.148 As yet
unresolved is the question of whether a forfeiture under a statute
enacted before 1970 can be considered a "criminal forfeiture"
within the meaning of the amendments.
A. United States v. Hall
On March 15, 1974, Arthur Hall brought two diamond rings
into the United States without declaring their $14,000 value to
customs officials. 149 Arrested by government agents, Hall was in-
dicted under 18 U.S.C. § 545.15" First enacted in 1866,151 section
545 makes smuggling a felony punishable by fine and imprison-
ment, and authorizes the forfeiture of merchandise introduced
into the United States in violation of the section.' 52 Before trial
144 Id. The forfeiture provision of § 1963 was held constitutional in United States v.
Amato, 367 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
14 521 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2) (1970).
146 S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79-80 (1969). Cf. H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 188 (dissenting views of Reps. Conyers, Mikva, and Ryan), reprinted in
[1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4083-84.
14' FED. R. CRIN. P. 54(b)(5).
148 Advisory Committee's Comments to the 1972 Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, 56 F.R.D. 143, 180 (1972).
149 United States v. Hall, 521 F.2d 406, 407 (9th Cir. 1975).
151Id.
, Act ofJuly 18, 1866, 14 Stat. 179.
,52 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
Whoever knowingly and willfully, with intent to defraud the United States,
smuggles, or clandestinely introduces into the United States any merchandise
which should have been invoiced ... ; or
Whoever fraudendy or knowingly imports or brings into the United States,
any merchandise contrary to law ...
Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.
Proof of defendants possession of such goods, unless explained to the satis-
faction of the jury, shall be deemed evidence sufficient to authorize conviction for
violation of this section.
Merchandise introduced into the United States in violation of this section, or
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Hall moved to quash the indictment for failure to "allege the ex-
tent of the interest or property subject to forfeiture" in accordance
with Rule 7(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
district court held the indictment defective, but ruled that the
proper remedy was to prohibit the government from claiming the
forfeiture, rather than to dismiss the prosecution.153 In the subse-
quent trial, Hall was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for
one year. The district judge suspended the sentence on the condi-
tion that Hall consent to civil forfeiture of the rings. 54
In a per curiam opinion, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed.155 The court held that to allow Hall to "consent" to a civil
forfeiture, after the government had failed to allege the property
subject to forfeiture in the indictment, denied Hall the opportunity
to defend against the forfeiture.156 Although observing that the
amendment to Rule 7 had originated in the 1970 Organized Crime
Control Act,' 57 the court nevertheless held that "Rule 7(c)(2) is
written in specific terms for general application. We cannot con-
scientiously disregard the Rule's plain mandatory language ....
The Justice Department contends that Hall was wrongly de-
cided and that the amendments to the Federal Criminal Rules
should apply .only to the two new forfeiture statutes, since "[fIrom
[1790] to [1970] ... no Federal statute has provided for a penalty
of forfeiture as a punishment for violation of a criminal statute of
the United States.' 59 To evaluate the conflict it is necessary to
consider what Congress meant by a "criminal forfeiture" in the
1970 Acts and in the amendments to the Criminal Rules. The ap-
propriate place to begin is the legislative history of the 1970 Acts.
B. What Is a "Criminal Forfeiture"?
In passing the 1970 Acts, Congress thought it was providing
for the first use of forfeiture as criminal punishment since the first
the value thereof, to be recovered from any person described in the first or sec-
ond paragraph of this section, shall be forfeited to the United States.




156 Id. at 408.
157 Id. at 407-08.
158 Id. at 408.
"9 Department of Justice Memo No. 828, supra note 12, at 3. In light of Hall, the
Federal Rules Advisory Committee has under consideration a further revision of the for-
feiture provisions. Interview with the Honorable William Webster, United States Circuit
Judge and member of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, in St. Louis, Missouri (Aug. 24, 1976).
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Congress abolished the common-law forfeitures consequent to
conviction and attainder of felony and treason.16" Thus, Congress
believed that it was repealing, in part, an Act of April 30, 1790,161
which provides that "[n]o conviction or judgment shall work cor-
ruption of blood or any forfeiture of estate." 162 But the 1790 Act
only abolished the common-law forfeitures that followed as conse-
quences of conviction and judgment of felony or treason; 163 purely
punitive forfeitures imposed either as a fine in a criminal prosecu-
tion or separately in a civil in rem proceeding have continued in
American law since the 1790 Act. 164 Nevertheless, Congress evi-
dently adopted the conception of "criminal forfeiture" offered in
the Justice Department's testimony explaining the 1970 Acts:
The concept of forfeiture as a criminal penalty which is em-
bodied in this provision differs from other presently existing
forfeiture provisions under Federal statutes where the proceed-
ing is in rem against the property and the thing which is declared
unlawful under the statute, or which is used for an unlawful
purpose, or in connection with the prohibited property or trans-
action, is considered the offender, and the forfeiture is no part of the
punishment for the criminal offense ... Such statutes having [sic] been
160 S. REP. No. 617, supra note 146, at 79-80; Advisory Committee's Comments to the
1972 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 56 F.R.D. 143, 157 (1972).
See notes 19, 69-73 and accompanying text supra.
161 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (1970).
162 Id. Twenty-two states have constitutional provisions essentially identical to § 3563.
ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 19; ALASKA CONsT. art. 1, § 15; ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 16; ARK. CONST.
art. 2, § 17; COLO. CONsT. art. 2, § 9; GA. CONST. art. 1, § 2-203; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 11;
IND. CONST. art 2, § 30; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 12; MD. CONST. Decl. of Rights art. 27;
MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 11; Mo. CONST. art 1, § 30; MONT. CONsT. art. 3, § 9; NEB. CONST.
art. 1, § 15; OHIo CONST. art. 1, § 12; ORE. CONST. art. 1, § 25; S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 8;
TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 12; TEx. CONST. art. 1, § 21; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 15; W. VA.
CoN sT. art. 3, § 18; WIs. CONST. art 1, § 12. Another seven states have provisions similar
to § 3563. CONN. CONST. art. 9, § 4; DEL. CONST. art. 9, § 19; Ky. CONST. Bill of Rights
§ 20; ME. CONST. art. 1, § 11; N.C. CONST. art. 1, 29; OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 15; PA. Co NsT.
art. 1, § 19. Florida has its own somewhat peculiar provision. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 17. None
of these constitutional provisions, with the possible exceptions of Florida and Oklahoma,
prohibits forfeiture imposed as a fine in a criminal prosecution; all are directed toward
eliminating common-law forfeiture consequent to conviction and attainder. Recent modern-
ization of constitutional language raises possible doubt in Florida and Oklahoma, although
there too, the correct interpretation is probably that only common-law forfeiture is forbid-
den. See also notes 73 supra & 163 infra.
163 See note 73 and accompanying text supra. The difference between the two is ex-
plained in 2 Z. SwFrT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAwS OF CONNECTICUT 405 (Windham 1796), and
illustrated by Commonwealth v. Pennock, 3 Serg. & Rawl. 199 (Pa. 1817); Woods v. Cot-
trell, 55 W. Va. 476, 482, 47 S.E. 275, 278 (1904); 21 R.C.L. Prisons and Prisoners § 20
(1918).
14 See notes 68-142 and accompanying textsupra.
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uniformly upheld against the objection that they violate due process on the
grounds that they are wholly preventive and remedial ....
Under the criminal forfeiture provision of section 1963,
however, the proceeding is in personam against the defendant who is the
party to be punished upon conviction of violation of any provision of the
section, not only by fine and/or imprisonment, but also by forfei-
ture .... 165
Congress believed that criminal forfeiture was distinguishable from
civil forfeiture because the former was directed primarily toward
punishing the wrongdoer upon proof of his personal guilt, while
the latter was primarily remedial.
166
If Congress indeed believed that all forfeitures since 1790
,have been primarily remedial and not punitive, then adoption of a
criminal mode of prosecution for what was thought to be the first
punitive forfeiture in nearly two hundred years stands as a legisla-
tive determination that a criminal prosecution rather than an in
rem proceeding should be used to impose forfeiture as punish-
ment. By approving the 1972 amendments to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Congress effectively overruled its determi-
nation in passing the Confiscation Acts in 1862 that an in rem
proceeding is an appropriate means to impose punishment.
167
Congress clearly directed that punitive forfeitures be imposed in
criminal prosecutions. On the other hand, Congress plainly in-
tended that remedial forfeitures continue to be imposed in rem.
The correctness of United States v. Hall, therefore, depends on
whether the forfeiture in that case was punitive oi remedial.
C. Is 18 U.S.C. § 545 a Criminal Forfeiture?
In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez 68 the Supreme Court stated
that the question whether a given sanction is punitive or remedial
is "extremely difficult and elusive of solution."'169 No one test is
decisive; indeed, in Mendoza-Martinez the Court referred to seven
different tests. 7" Nevertheless, the Court has made it clear that the
I" S. REP. No. 617, supra note 146, at 124 (emphasis added). See 116 CONG. REC.
35193 (remarks of Rep. Poff); 116 CONG. REc. 18939 (remarks of Senator McClellan).
166 The former Chief Counsel of the Senate Subcommittee that considered the Or-
ganized Crime Control Bill asserted that, according to Congress, the principal distinguish-
ing feature of the criminal forfeiture was the imposition of punishment upon a finding of
personal guilt. Interview with G. Robert Blakey, Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, in
Ithaca, New York (Sept. 14, 1976).
11
7 See notes 101-14 and accompanying text supra.
168 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
1 9 Id. at 168.
1
70 Id. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted):
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appropriate starting point is the intent of Congress in initially
passing the legislation in question.1
7 1
The forfeiture involved in United States v. Hall1 12' originated in
section four of the Act of July 18, 1866.173 The legislative history
of the section is confusing. Apparently Congress did not intend a
forfeiture under the section at all. Senator Morrill, the floor leader
of the bill, answered one query as follows:
[The] prosecution of the goods ... is not contemplated by
this section, and therefore it is irrelevant, to say the least of it.
I am speaking of the intent of this section. It was to
provide a remedy against the person, and not against the prop-
erty. We have a remedy against the property in the laws already
provided for.'
7 4
Although it is unclear whether Congress intended to authorize a
forfeiture, it did agree that the section was punitive. Senator Mor-
rill concurred in an opponent's statement that "[t]he whole pur-
pose of the section is to punish men for importing goods contrary
to law .... 1,5 Thus, Congress intended to impose only punitive
sanctions under the predecessor of section 545. The courts, after
some disagreement, finally decided that the section authorized a
forfeiture.
1 76
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has
historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a
finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies
is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry, and may often point in
differing directions.
See Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); Morissette v. United States, 342
U.S. 246 (1951); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); Helvering v.
Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); Charney, The Need for Constitutional Protections For Defendants
in Civil Penalty Cases, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 478 (1974).
171 For criticism of this approach, see Clark, supra note 14, a 436-44.
172 521 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1975).
173 14 Stat. 179 (1866). Subsequently, this section became R.S. § 3082 (1878); Tariff
Act of September 21, 1922, c. 356, § 593, 42 Stat. 982; Tariff Act ofJune 17, 1930, c. 497,
tit. IV, § 593, 46 Stat. 751. No significant change in the wording of the forfeiture provi-
sion was made until it was enacted into positive law as part of the 1948 codification of the
criminal code. Act of June 24, 1948, ch. 645, § 545, 62 Stat. 716.
'74 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2591-92 (1866).
1
75 Id. at 2591 (remarks of Senator Howe). Another Senator, who thought the section
did authorize a forfeiture, observed: "[T]he section is merely penal. As applied to goods
the necessary penalty must be forfeiture, because that is the only way you can punish the
thing." Id. at 2593 (remarks of Senator Edmunds).
"I In 1875 the New York Circuit Court said that there could be no forfeiture under
the section. United States v. A Lot of Jewelry, 26 F. Cas. 994, 996 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (No.
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Subsequent decisions support the conclusion that a forfeiture
under the Act of 1866 and its successors is punitive. In 1871 the
Supreme Court held the Act to be "strictly penal [and] not at all
remedial." 177 Seven years later, in United States v. Claflin,'
7 8 the
Court reconsidered and found a limited remedial aspect. The
Court said:
[A] renewed and more careful examination.. . has convinced us
that Congress,-in the act of 1866, had in view not only punish-
ment of the offence described, but indemnity to the government
for loss sustained in consequence of the criminal conduct of
those guilty of the offence. The [1866] act denounces a forfei-
ture of the goods concealed, &c., no matter in whose hands they may
be found.
1 7 9
Claflin did not prevent the lower federal courts from continually
construing forfeitures under the 1866 Act as punitive. In 1883, the
California Circuit Court, commenting that the forfeiture was "es-
sentially criminal and intended to punish a crime," noted that "[a]
criminal offense committed is the basis of the proceeding and
ground of punishment, alike, in the indictment, and of forfeiture
and condemnation on the information, and the same offense must
be shown in order to maintain either proceeding."' u ' Since the
promulgation of the Coffey doctrine in 1886-that an acquittal in a
criminal prosecution barred a subsequent punitive in rem suit
when "all that is imposed by the statute, as a consequence of guilt,
is a punishment therefor"' 8 1-courts have consistently held the
1866 Act punitive.1 2 Any support Claflin may have given to view-
ing section 545 as predominantly remedial was eliminated by the
language of the 1948 codification, which brought the section into
15,626). Nevertheless, in the 1880's the courts occasionally applied forfeitures under the
section without challenge. E.g., 3880 Boxes of Opium v. United States, 23 F. 367 (C.C.D.
Cal. 1883). In 1894 a court read the statute on its face, without regard to its legislative
history, and decided that the section did authorize a forfeiture. United States v. A Lot of
Jewelry, 59 F. 684, 686 (E.D.N.Y. 1894). The argument that the statute did not authorize a
forfeiture was raised again 25 years later, and was rejected. In re 200 7/12 Dozen Wool Hose,
263 F. 376 (2d Cir. 1920).
177 Stockwell v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 531, 551 (1871).
178 97 U.S. 546 (1878).
179 Id. at 553 (emphasis added). The Court found a remedial element in order to avoid
finding that the 1866 Act repealed a prior statute.
180 3880 Boxes of Opium v. United States, 23 F. 367, 394 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883).
181 Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436, 443 (1886). See notes 122-23 and accompany-
ing text supra.
182 See, e.g., United States v. 201 Fifty Pound Bags of Furazolidone, 52 F.R.D. 222




the Criminal Code. Under the present version of section 545,
property is not subject to forfeiture unless it is recovered from the
smuggler. 8 3 The rationale of Claflin has vanished.
The three other principal tests that distinguish the punitive
from the remedial-scienter, relationship of sanction to injury, and
placement in the statutory scheme-further support the conclusion
that section 545 is punitive. 8 4 First, section 545 requires the pros-
ecution to prove scienter. 85 Second, the statute requires no show-
ing of a relationship between sanction and injury; the forfeiture
imposed may be totally disproportionate to the government's in-
jury. For example, an owner forfeits his goods for failure to invoice
them, even though they are not subject to duty or other regu-
lation. 86 Finally, section 545's placement in the statutory scheme of
customs and smuggling statutes is evidence that it is punitive. As
the Supreme Court recently observed:
The forfeiture provision [of a related customs statute] fell within
... the "Administrative Provisions" [and was therefore a civil
sanction]. Section 545, on the other hand, was part of the "En-
forcement Provisions" and became part of the Criminal Code of
the United States. The fact that the sanctions were separate and
distinct and were contained in different parts of the statutory
scheme is relevant in determining the character of the forfeiture.
Congress could and did order both civil and criminal sanctions,
clearly distinguishing them.
87
Thus forfeiture under section 545 is punitive. Ordinarily, a
punitive forfeiture should be regarded as a criminal forfeiture
under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. A criminal forfei-
113See note 152 supra. The present version of § 545 eliminates the doctrine of relation
back because the forfeiture applies to either the goods or their value. See Caldwell v. United
States, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 366 (1850); National Atlas Elevator Co. v. United States, 97 F.2d
940, 943 (8th Cir. 1938).
The draftsmen of the 1948 codification almost certainly did not intend to change the
wording of § 545 to create a criminal forfeiture. Just two years earlier, the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which embodied the conventional view, had gone into effect and
made a criminal forfeiture a procedural impossibility. See note 148 and accompanying text
supra-
18, See Charney, supra note 170, at 491-95.
185 See 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1970), set out in note 152 supra. Under § 545 the government
must prove the state of mind of the person who introduced the goods into the country.
Usually, if not always, this person is the owner. Thus, in order to contest the forfeiture, an
owner risks being found to be a smuggler.
186 See Annot.. 20 A.L.R. Fed. 410, 424 (1974).
187 One Lot Emerald Cut Stones & One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 236
(1972). This case dealt with the more usual customs statute in which forfeiture is imposed
regardless of state of mind. Section 545, on the other hand, requires a finding of personal
guilt before forfeiture will lie. See note 98 and accompanying text supra.
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ture is a forfeiture imposed as punishment for personal guilt.188
Since "punishment" as used in Anglo-American law implies per-
sonal guilt of the person punished, 189 in the usual case no separate
showing of a statutory requirement of proof of personal guilt
should be necessary to establish a forfeiture as criminal. In any
event, section 545 does explicitly require proof of personal guilt.190
Property can be forfeit only upon a finding that the person from
whom it is recovered is guilty of smuggling. Although the smuggler
from whom the property is recovered will not always be the owner,
the property will still be subject to forfeiture under section 545. But
that occasional case does not alter the character of the forfeiture
as punishment in the usual situation where, as in Hall, the alleged
smuggler and the owner are one and the same. Therefore, the
Ninth Circuit could reasonably find that a punitive forfeiture re-
quiring proof of the owner's guilt is a criminal forfeiture within the
meaning of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Yet the court
reached this result without analysis of the issues and thereby con-
tinued the current misconception that all forfeitures, whether civil
or criminal, are necessarily the same.
IV.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Not all forfeitures are alike; some are remedial and some are
punitive. 91 Although in enacting the 1970 Acts Congress assumed
188 See notes 160-67 and accompanying text supra.
189 A. Quinton argues there is "a logically necessary relation holding between guilt and
punishment. Only the guilty can be punished .... ." Quinton, On Punishment in THE
PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT 55, 63 (H.B. Acton ed. 1969). See also Flew, The Justification of
Punishment, id. at 83; Baier, Is Punishment Retributive?, id. at 130.
'
9 0 
See note 185 supra.
191 In discussing their law, German commentators reached the same fundamental dis-
tinction some years ago. They now agree that a German forfeiture must be considered
either as "Strafe" (punishment) or as a "SicherungsmaBnahme" (preventive measure). See
A. ESER, DIE STRAFRECHTLICHEN SANKTIONEN GEGEN DAS EIGENTuM 67-70, 72-73, 76-77
(1969); A. SCH6NKE & H. SCHR6DER, STRAFGESETZBUCH KOMMENTAR § 40, at 184-85 (12th
ed. 1965). Any restructuring of American law would benefit from study of the extensive
German literature, which systematically considers many of the same problems encountered
here. For a good bibliography, see A. ESER, supra, at 382-88. Particularly relevant are the
forfeiture provisions of the new German criminal code of 1975 which replaced the
century-old prior law. The old law was changed partly to bring forfeiture provisions into
accord with the West German constitution by protecting innocent parties. Cf. STGB §
73-76a (1975) (new code provisions extensively rewritten, expanded, and detailed); STGB
§§ 40-42 (1953); RSTGB §§ 40-42 (1871) (original code sections). See generallyV A.
SCHONKE & H. SCHR6DER, STRAFGESETZBUCH KOMMENTAR §§ 73-76a, at 726-71 (18th ed.
1976) (A. Eser, contributor). For a discussion in English of recent changes in German for-
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that all prior forfeiture statutes were remedial, this certainly was
not the case. In spite of this misconception, Congress has deter-
mined that an in rem proceeding is an inappropriate means to
impose punishment. Therefore, although a remedial forfeiture
may be imposed in a civil in rem proceeding, a court should im-
pose a punitive forfeiture only upon criminal conviction of the
owner.1
92
The procedural classification of forfeiture statutes will con-
tinue to cause confusion as long as there are punitive forfeiture
statutes that specifically provide for civil in rem proceedings. Con-
gress should repeal those statutory provisions that require the in
rem proceeding. Where statutes do not specifically provide for a
particular proceeding, Congress should furnish a rule for distin-
guishing criminal from civil forfeitures. Several midwestern states
have such rules. 193 Until Congress acts, however, the courts must
determine whether the forfeiture is civil or criminal where the
statute is silent on the issue.
In deciding this question, the courts should use the criteria
established by Congress-namely, a forfeiture is criminal if it im-
poses punishment and rests on a finding of personal guilt. When a
court finds that a given forfeiture is punitive, and therefore crimi-
nal, the owner will be entitled to all constitutional protections
granted a criminal defendant.'9 4 In the exercise of this duty, the
courts should not conclude that a remedial forfeiture is criminal in
order to avoid an unjust result. If Congress has established a re-
medial forfeiture, the courts should treat the forfeiture as civil.
In light of this reexamination of forfeiture law, it is appro-
priate for the judiciary to reconsider its own doctrines in order to
ameliorate most of the evil results of present day forfeiture law.
The judiciary should consider the readoption of older views aban-
doned scarcely a half century ago. Specifically, three changes
feiture law, see Maxeiner, Constitutionalizing Forfeiture Law-The German Example (on
file at the Cornell Law Review).
192 The objections to an in rem action to impose a punitive forfeiture are not necessar-
ily present in a civil in personam action to impose a similar forfeiture. Although Congress
could provide for such a procedure, it has not done so. There is precedent for such civil in
personam forfeitures in the practice of the English Exchequer. See notes 45-51 and accom-
panying text supra.
193 The rule in Wisconsin states: "Where a forfeiture imposed by statute shall be in-
curred it may be recovered in a civil action unless the act or omission is punishable by fine
and imprisonment or by fine or imprisonment." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 288.01 (West 1958).
There are similar rules in Michigan and North Dakota. MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 27A.4801,
.4805 (1962); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-14-01 (1975).
194 See note 148 and accompanying text supra.
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would effectively minimize the severity of the law without reducing
its overall effectiveness:
(1) Vicarious liability should not be considered typical of all
forfeitures, but should be found only if there is a clear congres-
sional mandate. The appropriate extent of vicarious liability should
depend upon the character of the forfeiture and the need for such
liability to effect the statute's purpose.
195
(2) Relation back of the forfeiture to the time of the offense
should not be assumed, but should be applied only if the statute
directs it. Justice Story's presumption against relation back should
be adopted.
96
(3) The rule that no little thing will work a forfeiture without
the owner's complicity should be applied where appropriate. 197
All three of these doctrines were created but later abandoned
by the judiciary. They were general rules of interpretation and
were not limited to any specific statutes. The present day concep-
tions of unlimited vicarious liability and relation back to the time of
the offense owe their existence solely to judicial adoption of a
perverse version of the fiction of guilty property. That fiction
should at long last be abandoned and a rule of-reason reinstated.
In the words of the late medieval English writer St. German:
DOCTOUR) In the cases that thou haste put before of the
stray & deodand there be consyderacyons why they be forfet/ but
it is not so here/ & me thynketh that in this case [the finder
should hold the property on behalf of the owneri sauynge his
reasonable expences/ & this me thinketh were more resonable law than
to pull the property out of the owner without cause.' 98
James R. Maxeiner
195 See notes 32-44. 66-67, 78-80, 134-41 and accompanying text supra. See also United
States v. One 1969 Plymouth Fury, 509 F.2d 1324 (5th Cir. 1975) (dissenting opinion,
Wisdom, Brown, Ainsworth, Dyer, Clark & Gee, JJ.).
"' See notes 37, 74 and accompanying text supra.
"7 See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
198 ST. GERMAN, supra note 28, at 291-92 (emphasis added).
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